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SUPREME COURT No. 16971 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF CASE 
Centurian Corporation ("Centurian") brought an action 
against A. L. Cripps and Walter A. Cripps ("Cripps"), claiming a 
delinquent amount due under a lease agreement to repossess a 
tank trailer, the subject matter of the lease. Subsequently, 
Petty Motor Lease, Inc. ("Petty"), claiming to be the owner of 
the vehicle leased by Centurian to Cripps moved to intervene in 
the action. The motion to intervene was granted. However, the 
case was filed in a separte number and file. Trial was held 
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July 13, 1976. The trial court, in a memorandum decision and in 
the judgment, held that it was without jurisdiction of the 
complaint of Petty against the defendants in intervention, 
Centurian Corporation, Richard Nickles and Margaret K. Nickles. 
Petty appealed and Centurian and Nickles cross-appealed. 
This court remanded the matter back to the trial court and the 
trial court gave relief to Petty as against Centurian and 
Nickles but denied relief to Centurian and Nickles as against 
Cripps. Both Petty and Centurian/Nickles sought additional 
relief of the trial court by way of motions to amend, but both 
motions were denied. Centurian and Nickles timely perfected 
this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants Centurian and Nickles seek a reversal of the 
trial court and a judgment in their favor against Petty; or in 
the alternative a reduction in the judgment in favor of Petty 
together with relief against Cripps in whatever amount Petty 
obtains against Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In February 1973, Centurian and Nickles leased a new 
1973 trans-liner semi tank trailer from Petty. The lease is 
dated February 1, 1973 and is guaranteed by Richard H. Nickles 
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and Margaret K. Nickles individually. (Exhibit 7-I} At the 
same time an additional document was executed wherein Centurian, 
at the end of the lease agreed to purchase, after all payments 
under the lease have been paid, for the sum of $621.00. This 
document is guaranteed by Richard H. Nickles only and not by 
Margaret K. Nickles. (Exhibit 8-I} 
Centurian used the trailer for a few loads and then 
leased the same to Cripps. Cripps was to hold Centurian and 
Nickles harmless under the terms of the lease and or purchase 
agreement. (Exhibit P-1) It was admitted by Cripps at trial 
that they were in default of the payments as required by Exhibit 
P-1 and the trial court granted judgment for all past due pay-
ments on the trailer to Centurian. 
In February or March 1974, the tank trailer was stolen 
by a person or persons unknown. This theft was duly reported to 
the Carbon County Sheriff. (Record, 269: Exhibit 4-P} At the 
time of said theft, Centurian/Nickles was current on the obliga-
tion to Petty. (Exhibit 9-I} 
Exhibit 7-I, which was drafted by Petty, specifically 
required Centurian/Nickles to provide insurance for public 
liability. The provisions relating to insurance coverage for 
fire, theft, comprehensive and collision have been left blank, 
but does recite that Petty may have in effect insurance coverage 
for fire, theft, comprehensive and collision and that if Cen-
turian/Nickles furnishes a policy for this coverage, then Petty 
would cancel their own coverage. 
-4-
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The lease further provides for termination automati-
cally if any rental payment is not paid within ten {10) days of 
the due date., There was a payment due on March 15, 1974 for 
March. No payment was made by either Centurian/Nickles and/or 
Cripps. There was a deposit of $3,594.63 made on February 1, 
1973 to insure faithful performance of the lease and return of 
the property. If there is a violation of the lease agreement, 
Petty may retain such portion to compensate for the loss or 
damage. {Exhibit 7-I) 
In the first proceeding, Centurian/Nickles was granted 
judgment only as to the past due installments per Exhibit P-1 
and attorney's fees {Record 105-110), while specifically holding 
that the trailer had been stolen on/or about March 15, 1974 and 
that no evidence was introduced of Cripps' negligence or that 
Cripps had failed to properly take care of the trailer. {Record 
109) 
The trial court, on remand held that Petty and Cen-
turian/Nickles {both Nickles) had entered into a purchase 
agreement and that the sum of $12,367.37 was due on said agree-
ment. Although the court had heretofore dismissed Cripps' 
counterclaim {Record 110), the trial court concluded that Cripps 
owed no liability to Centurian/Nickles. 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EXHIBITS 7-I AND 
8-I CONSTITUTE A SALE. 
There is no dispute that the parties executed Exhibits 7-I 
and 8-I, insofar as they bear the signatures of the respective 
parties. Exhibit 7-I is labelled "Lease." The terms all discuss 
a lease. There are no provisions of purchase in Exhibit 7-I. 
Exhibit 8-I, labelled, "Agreement of Sale and Purchase," 
drafted by Petty, is conditional and does not constitute a sale 
under the Uniform Commercial Code. The language of condition is 
as follows: 
User has leased from Owner a 1973 trans-liner 
semi-tank trailer, Serial No. 151472, and desires 
to purchase said unit at the termination of the 
lease, after all payments called for by the lease 
have been paid, and the Owner desires to sell the 
unit to User at that time. 
This is clearly a provision giving Centurian the right 
to purchase at the termination of the lease and after all pay-
ments have been made. The lease provides in paragraph 6. 
This lease may be terminated at any time during 
the period of the Lease. • • • If this Lease is 
terminated by either Owner or User for any reason 
or expires as provided in paragraph 1, hereof, 
User agrees to pay to Owner any and all past due 
payments • • . plus the final lease payment in 
full, and ••• 45 percent of the monthly rental 
multiplied by the number of months the lease has 
yet to run ••••• " 
Centurian had the right, at any time, to terminate the 
lease. If it had so elected, the trailer was to be returned 
less reasonable wear and tear and the liquidated damages as 
-6-
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provided in paragraph 6 would apply. The Uniform Commercial 
Code defines in Section 70A-2-106, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, a sale as: 
A "Sale" consists in the passing of title from 
the seller to the buyer for a price •••• 
Title to the trailer in question always remained in Petty during 
the term of the Lease. The language of Exhibit 8-I is con-
trolling and discloses that only upon: 
• The termination of the lease, after all 
payments called for by the lease have been paid, 
and the Owner desires to sell unit to User at 
that time. {emphasis supplied) 
is there an intent or desire to pass title to buyer from seller 
for a price. The words "at that time" refer back to the condi-
tions of termination of the Lease and all payments called for by 
the lease have been made. The unrebutted testimony and admis-
sion by Petty is: 
Q. {By Mr. Petty) Now, Mr. Petty, I show you 
what's been marked as Exhibit 8-I, and I'll ask 
you if you recognize that document? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Would you described it for the Court? 
A. Yes, it's a purchase agreement to be effec-
tive at the end of the lease which I just 
described. After the lease payments have been 
made, then the purchase agreement is for $621 to 
be effective at the end of the lease. {Record 
276, 277) 
Petty admitted the so called "sale" was to be effective 
after the lease payments have been made. Mr. Petty further 
testified at page 279: 
-7-
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Q. Has Centurian Corporation ever been delin-
quent on this lease? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Since what date? 
A. Since March of '74. They were delinquent a 
little bit at--for short periods before that a 
time or two, but since March of '74 they have 
been delinquent. 
The provisions of the lease state: 
That Owner hereby leases to User •••• which 
lease shall be strictly under the following terms 
and conditions: 
1. User agrees to pay to Owner as rental 
for the use of said property the sum of $580.00 
per month. • • • If any rental payment is not 
paid within 10 days after the due date thereof, 
this lease shall automatically expire. (emphasis 
added) 
This Lease expired, by its own terms, on the 25th day 
of March, 1974. At that point in time, not all of the payments 
called for under the lease had been made. These covenants and 
conditions precedent were not complied with and hence there 
could not be a valid enforceable contract of sale. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THERE IS A CONTRACT OF SALE, MARGARET K. 
NICKLES IS NOT BOUND TO SAID SALE, SINCE SHE IS 
NOT A PARTY TO SAID AGREEMENT. 
The trial court relied on a construction of both Exhi-
bits 7-I and 8-I together to form a "sale." Exhibit 8-I does 
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not bear the signature of Margarent K. Nickles. It is elemen-
tary that in order to hold Margaret K. Nickles personally 
liable, she would have to be signatory to said agreement. 
POINT III 
THE LEASE AGREEMENT PLACES THE RISK OF THEFT ON 
PETTY ABSENT NEGLIGENCE ON BEHALF OF CEN-
TURIAN/NICKLES. 
The Lease agreement provides in part: 
The ( ) agrees to maintain ••• fire, 
theft, comprehensive ••• insurance on the above 
described property, which insurance shall provide 
protection for Owner and User as their interests 
may appear. • • • Owner may have in effect at 
the commencement of this lease fire, theft, com-
prehensive ••• insurance. If User furnishes 
Owner with evidence of satisfactory insurance 
coverage within fifteen days from the commence-
ment of the lease, Owner's insurance policy shall 
be terminated with no expense to User. However, 
if evidence of satisfactory insurance coverage 
has not been furnished by User within fifteen 
days of the commencment of this lease, User shall 
pay to Owner the total premium under such 
insurance policy of Owner and that policy may be 
kept in full force and effect during the term of 
this lease. 
Petty drafted the agreement. It is a form used over 
the years specifically prepared by Petty. Petty, in preparing 
this contract, filled in the preceding insurance provision 
wherein Centurian was made responsible for obtaining liability 
coverage. Petty left the fire and theft blank. By doing so 
Petty assumed that risk since Petty is the owner of the property 
and title had not passed. Centurian had no knowledge of whether 
Petty had fire and theft coverage, but the language would lead 
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
one to believe Petty had this coverage in mind and had taken 
steps to cover this risk. 
The uncontroverted evidence discloses that Petty had 
actual knowledge of the sub-lease agreement (and/or sale) to 
Cripps. At page 74 of the record there appears an assignment, 
wherein Petty acknowledges the Centurian-Cripps Agreement and 
gives Centurian all right and interest to pursue its cause of 
action. Centurian did not have possession of, nor control of, 
the trailer at the time of its loss by theft. Mr. Walter Cripps 
testified at page 269: 
Q. When was the last time that you saw the 
trailer. 
A. February of '74. 
Q. And where was it at that time? 
A. Henry Mills' property in Lower Middle Creek. 
Q. Where is that? Where is Lower Middle Creek? 
A. South of Price about four miles. 
Q. Carbon County? 
A. Carbon County. 
Q. Do you know where the trailer is today? 
A. I do not. 
Q. Have you a record--well, what has happened to 
the trailer? Do you know what has happened to it? 
A. The trailer was stolen, taken off from Henry 
Mills' property without permission. 
Q. Did you make any report of that to the 
authorities? 
-10-
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A. As soon as I found out it was stolen I 
reported it. 
Q. Calling your attention to Exhibit 4P, were 
you the person who reported that missing trailer 
on that particular date? 
A. To the best of my knowledge that is true and 
correct. 
The trial court found, at page 109 of the record: 
12. That on or about March 15, 1974, the tank 
trailer was stolen. 
13. The record is absolutely devoid of any 
evidence that Defendants were negligent or failed 
to take proper care to the tank trailer so as to 
prevent it from being stolen. 
Centurian/Nickles did not even have possession of the 
trailer at the time of the theft, but were seeking to obtain 
possession by way of a Writ of Replevin. The law has long been 
established under circumstances of bailment for hire that in the 
absence of negligence the bailee is not liable for an act of a 
third party intervenor. In 8 Am.Jur.2d Bailments §201 by the 
following language: 
Unless a bailee has violated his contract he will 
not be liable in the absence of negligence, for 
loss of injury in respect to the thing bailed, 
resulting from the inherent nature of the prop-
erty itself or some infirmity thereof, from 
disaster or accidental casualty or from robbery, 
burglary, or theft. 
This general law has been applied by this court in the 
case of Barlow Upholstry and Furniture Co. v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 
900 (Utah 1975). In the case of Stehle Equipment Co. v. Alpha 
Construction & Dev. Co., 247 Md. 210, 230 A.2d 654 (1967) the 
Maryland court in addressing this question stated at page 655: 
-11-
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In its brief, appellee conceded that there was a 
bailment for hire which imposed upon the bailee 
an obligation to exercise ordinary care and 
diligence in using and safeguarding the bailed 
property and to return it in as good condition, 
ordinary wear and tear excepted, as when it was 
received. (citations omitted) Once appellant 
proved the delivery, the bailment for hire, and 
the unexplained failure to return the property in 
its condition when received, a prima facie case 
of negligence was made out. However, where the 
loss was accounted for as having been occasioned 
by a cause which would excuse the bailee, the 
defense was complete unless the bailer followed 
by showing that the bailee, by the exercise of 
ordinary care, might have avoided the injury. 
(citations omitted and emphasis supplied) 
This same view has been held by the Texas court in 
Tuloma Rigging, Inc. v. Barge and Crane Rentals, Etc., 460 
S.W.2d 510 (Texas 1970) wherein it states: 
We think it is the law that if a lessee, without 
fault, is denied useful possession of the leased 
property, the purpose of the lease agreement is 
so frustrated as to discharge lessee of his obli-
gation further to pay rent. A mutual benefit 
bailee is not liable if the subject-matter of the 
bailment has been injured by some internal decay, 
by accident, or by some other means wholly with-
out his fault, and in the absence of some special 
stipulation, as injury to or loss of the property 
usually falls on the bailer. The bailee, however, 
is required to exercise ordinary care to preserve 
and protect the bailed property in the absence of 
agreements providing otherwise. (citations 
omitted and emphasis supplied) 
To the same effect is the Grav Eagles, Inc. v. 
Lucchese, 37 Mich. App. 322, 194 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. 1972). The 
act of theft was an independant act over which Centurian/Nickles 
had no control. The only possible thrust of negligence would be 
the choosing of Cripps as a sub-lessee. No allegation exists of 
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said negligence, nor was any proof offered by any party of any 
negligence on behalf of anyone. It is therefore submitted that: 
A. Petty assumed the risk by the insurance pro-
visions of the contract (Exhibit 7-1). 
B. Petty as bailer assumed that risk as a matter 
of law absent any negligence on the part of Cen-
tur ian/Nickles and/or Cripps. 
Since the subject matter of the lease itself no longer 
exists, there can be no performance demanded of Centurian/Nickles 
by Petty absent that element of negligence. The lease was paid 
in full through the time of the theft. Thereafter, no further 
payments were due, since Petty could no longer perform its part 
of the bargain, to wit: no trailer. 
POINT IV 
CENTURIAN/NICKLES IS ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION 
FROM CRIPPS 
Assuming arguendo, that the trial court is correct 
Centurian/Nickles is entitled to indemnification from Cripps. 
Exhibit P-1 states in part: 
Purchaser [Cripps] agrees that he will hold 
seller [Centurian] harmless from and does hereby 
assume and agree to pay Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto. 
Exhibit "A" to P-1 is the combination of the Lease and 
Agreement of Sale and Purchase. The trial court held that 
Centurian had requested PIE to ground the trailer and had 
therefore breached its lease with Cripps. Centurian had that 
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right under the PIE lease. Cripps was in default by their own 
I admission at page 264: 
Q [by Mr. Bryner] Mrs. Cripps, do you admit 
there was a delinquency for the month of October. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you admit there was a delinquency for 
the month of November. 
A. Yes. 
The agreement between Centurian and Cripps provides: 
In the event of any default in the payments 
reserved to seller herein, the seller shall have 
the right to repossess said tank trailer unit 
with or without legal process ••.•• 
It was December 19, 1973, when Centurian "grounded" the 
trailer (well after the admitted default of Cripps). Mr. Cripps 
testified: 
Q. Well, my question was: Why did you not 
operate the trailer after December 19, 1973? 
A. Well, Mr. Nickles grounded it from PIE, and I 
cound't put it to work with PIE. (Record 269) 
Mr. Nickles testified at page 255 and 256: 
Q. [by Mr. Bryner] During the month of Decem-
ber, and specifically around the 19th of December 
of 1973, isn't it true that you contacted Pacific 
Intermountain Express and asked them to ground 
that trailer? 
A. I believe that was as a--after the conclusion 
of a meeting with Mr. Cripps personally in our 
parking lot where he refused to give us the money 
from two checks he had in his possession. Then 
we asked that the equipment be grounded. 
The demand on him at that time was made for 
the equipment. We told him the transaction 
wasn't satisfactory. 
-14-
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Q. All right. I'm not asking you that. I'm 
asking whether or not you did contact anyone at 
PIE with the intent of essentially grounding the 
trailer? 
A. I believe so; yes. 
Q. If you contacted PIE for the purpose of 
having the trailer grounded, it's true is it not, 
then, the trailer was not in New Mexico? 
A. We didn't know where the trailer was. The 
purpose of calling PIE was to put an end 
to--impound it in their yard when it came back. 
The object was not for them to let it go if it 
came back at all. 
Q. In other words, you indicated to them that 
you did not want that trailer to further operate 
if it came into their yard? 
A. Into their possession; yes. 
Centurian had every contractual right to try and get 
possession of the trailer with or without legal recourse. 
Centurian had the right, as one of the lessors of the equipment, 
to instruct PIE to impound the same. PIE did not do so. Later, 
the trailer was stolen. Said act of "grounding" the trailer was 
in conformity with Exhibit P-1. 
POINT V 
DAMAGES ASSESSED ARE INAPPROPRIATE UNDER THE LAW, 
AND THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES ARE IN THE NATURE OF A 
PENALTY. 
The damages assessed by the trial court are based upon 
an agreement of purchase and does not take into consideration 
the terms of the lease and prospective sale. That point will 
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not be reargued here. However, the lease does provide that 
damages of 45% of the monthly rental ($580.00) for the remaining 
monthly payments left on said lease, together with the last 
monthly payment in full is to be paid if the lease is terminated 
early by either party. This is to apply even if termination is 
under paragraph 1 which states in part: 
If the rental payment is not paid within 10 days 
after the due date thereof, this lease shall 
automatically expire. 
The March 15, 1974 payment was not made nor any there-
after. On March 25, 1974 there was no lease in force, it had 
been automatically terminated. There would be 20 installments 
due of $508.00 which equals $10,160.00. Forty-five percent of 
$10,160.00 equals $4,572.00, plus the last installment of $508.00 
equals $5,080.00 less the deposit of $3,594.63 equals a net due 
of $1,485.37. 
However, the foregoing really has no bearing to the 
actual damages sustained since the trailer was stolen and no 
damages were in fact incurred beyond Petty's own risk. In the 
case of Brown v. Rennels, 539 P.2d 1312 (Colo. 1975) the court 
held: 
••• [L]iquidated damages are not recoverable in 
addition to actual damages." (citations omitted) 
Therefore, Petty is, as a matter of law, entitled to actual 
damages. There are no actual damages in this instance because 
of the theft. Petty is also estopped to assert liquidated 
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damages since there can be no further rents due since the sub-
ject matter of the lease is no longer available for Centurian 
use. 
POINT VI 
PETTY OWES CENTURIAN/NICKLES THE SUM OF $3,594.63. 
Petty either assumed the risk of theft unless the con-
tractual arrangements on insurance coverage and/or assumed that 
risk as bailer. There was a deposit acknowledged received by 
Petty in the amount of $3,594.63 to insure performance of the 
monthly payments. The contract states in part: 
User agrees to deposit with Owner the sum of 
$3,594.63 to be held by Owner, without interest, 
until all terms of this lease have been faith-
fully performed and the property returned to 
Owner in a satisfactory condition, whereupon said 
deposit shall be returned to User. 
Petty breached the lease agreement by not being able to 
give to Centurian/Nickles the quiet and peaceful prossession and 
use of the trailer after it was stolen, nor did Petty replace 
said trailer. Therefore, Centurian/Nickles is entitled to the 
return of the deposit since at the time of the theft all sums 
had been paid to the theft denied Centurian/Nickles the useful 
possession of the leased property. The lessee is discharged of 
any further obligation to pay rent thereafter, see Tuloma, 
supra, p. 513. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in concluding that there was a 
sale and should have held there was only a lease with a condi-
tional future sale which did not materialize. Centurian/Nickles 
is entitled to a judgment in its favor as against Petty in the 
amount of $3,594.63 or in the alternative Centurian/Nickles is 
entitled to judgment against Cripps for full indemnification. 
In no event should any judgment be entered as against 
Margaret K. Nickles since she is not a guarantor of the so 
called "Agreement of Sale and Purchase." 
Respectf~!lY submitted, 
,, 
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